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just friends ok..OPERATION DESERT STORM
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 Aug 1990, reportedly over the disputed islands of Warbah and Bubiyan and the Rumailah oilfields, led to the first conflict of the post-Cold War era. UN reaction was to condemn the invasion, apply trade and economic sanctions. The multi-national coalition forces led by the United States was quickly formed and deployed to enforce UN resolution. The Allied attack on Iraq on 17 Jan 1991 highlighted the significance of electronic warfare in the conduct of a modern air warfare. The destruction of Iraq's IADS provides very good study in the area of electronic combat, thus deserves a close examination. Before we discuss the air campaign, let us look at the definition of electronic warfare (EW) for better understanding of the subject.
EW is the use of electro-magnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electro-magnetic spectrum and to retain friendly use of that spectrum. It involves Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and Communications Intelligence (COMINT) gathering activities. ELINT is the locating and identifying of the enemy’s electronic order of battle, which includes surveillance and early warning radars and missile guidance frequencies. COMINT is the locating, identifying and monitoring of enemy communications. Both ELINT and COMINT form Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).
The Allied assault on Iraq saw the collapse of a formidable Iraqi integrated air defense system (IADS), probably the most lethal outside the Warsaw pact. The Iraqi system had much in common with the Soviet system, including equipment, deployments operational doctrine and diversity of types. What follows is how it was done. The lraqi lADS was a composite system which integrated European and Soviet search and acquisition radar, and a range of Soviet and European SAM and AAA systems, all bonded together with a French built Kari C3 (Command, Control and Communications) network.
Soviet advisors originally built the Iraqi air defense system and, despite considerate infusions of Western technology, it retained its Soviet-style centralization. It gained some protection against countermeasures because it employed a wide variety of radars. However, that also made it difficult to maintain, and probably also problematic to reconstitute after severe damage. The system had also been described as difficult to analyze, precisely because of its hybrid character. Organizationally, the Iraqi lADS was split into three components
First, was Soviet style national air defense organization controlling both the fighters and fixed SA-2 and SA-3 air-defense missiles mainly protecting airfields.
Second, a missile air–defense system operated by Republican Guard, covering key nuclear, biological and chemical warfare facilities and finally, the Iraqi armies own mobile radar, SAM and AAA systems tasked with protecting both fixed sites and units in the field.
Air Defence and Early Warning
Iraq’s was described as an integrated air defense system, which means that its fighters, various missiles and antiaircraft guns were all centrally controlled so that they could operate to complement each other. Geographically Iraq national lADS was split into several large zones, in each of which were located central local C3 facilities, one or more large hardened airbases and a network of communications links to fixed radar and SAM sites. Control of the whole network was centered in hardened facilities in the vicinity of Baghdad. While microwave links were used extensively, these were backed up by landlines. The main air-defense center of the national system was located in Baghdad, with subcenters at Kirkuk, Nasiriya, and Routba to control the four-defensive sectors.
The principal early-warning radars were Soviet-supplied Tall Kings, with low altitude cover by Soviet supplied Squat Eyes Fighters were controlled by Soviet-type Bar Lock radars. Iraq also had a variety of Western radars, either supplied by France or captured in Iran and Kuwait. However, It is not clear how many captured radars were actually functioning, given the limited spare parts available to the Iraqis.
The network of fixed radars was supplemented by several Adnans, Soviet supplied IL 76 transports fitted with license built French Tiger G radars (the local designation was SDA-G). Adnan-1 had its radar in a ventral hump under its after fuselage whilst Adnan-2 had a rotodome. Although both aircraft were likened to the US AWACS, the comparison was ridiculous. Tigers could handle only a few targets, and each Adnan could directly control only a few fighters, probably as few as four. Control was verbal, based on manual calculation: Adnan lacked both the computers and the data links of modern early-warning aircraft, as such it did not have the data link to integrate its radar data with the national system.
Iraqi fighters all operated under tight ground control (the system is called GCI, ground control intercept). GCI/EW system formed the top tier of the lADS, which were used for wide area surveillance and early warning supporting, not only fighters with GCI vectors, but also datalinking early warning information down to individual SAM and AAA batteries supported by a range of early warning and acquisition radar, mobile and relocatable, such as the Flat Face, Squat Eye and Spoon Rest3. They follow the proper operating conditions which will remain off the air until a target was to be engaged, at which time they would light up, acquire and track the target and feed the target’s parameters to the fire control radar’s associated with the SAM and AAA system in use.
Area Defence SAM Systems
The fire control/tracking radars associated with the SAM and AAA systems were typically, co-located. In most instances they were dedicated to the weapon in use such as SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6. SA-2 (Guideline) uses the UHF (147-161 MHz) Spoon Rest for target acquisition (scan rate 1-3 or 2-6 RPM, nominal range 200-275 km). A Side Net height finder often supplements spoon Rest. The system uses the track-while-scan Fan Song for target tracking and missile guidance. Spoon Rest and Side Net can also acquire targets for a SA-3 battery. SA-3 (Goa) generally uses Squat Eye or Flat Face (a similar radar with its two, rather than one, antennas mounted much lower) for target acquisition. The fire control radar is Low Blow. With approximately 70 batteries they provide area defence coverage.
Point Defence SAM Systems
Approximately 250 point defenses SAM systems were dedicated for area defense. The most potent point defense SAMs were the SA-8 Gecko and the Franco-German Euromissile “Roland” (short range missile). Both systems were fully mobile with self contained TELAR as the fire unit, and have autonomous acquisition radars. The Roland is the Western equivalent to the SA-8 with fully traversable turret has rails with two ready rounds, and can reload a further eight from magazines in the hull on either side of the turret. Like the SA-8 the Roland uses fully automatic command to line of sight guidance. It does seem likely that the Republican Guard, rather than either the air-defense system or the Iraqi Army, controlled these weapons. Given the extent of Saddam Hussein other arrangements to protect himself and his regime against coups, it is reasonable to assume that he would have wanted to provide himself with a specially loyal inner air defense against possible attack by his own air force. Iraq had 127 Roland at the outbreak of the war and some of these were used to protect airfields.
Both the Roland and the Gecko are considered serious threats to low flying aircraft as they can be easily hidden and operate autonomously, while their tracking radars are substantially immune to simpler trackbreaking ECM techniques by virtue of monopuIse angle tracking. The Roland and Gecko missiles were however an unimpressive lightweight heatseeker, capable of tail aspect engagements only.
The static area defense SAMs were suppIernented by a respectable quantity of AAA equipment, the heavier caliber supported by tracking radars. The AAA was further supplemented by machine guns, hand held automatic weapons and man portable SAMs such as the SA-7B and SA-14, and the Chinese built HN-5A, a modified SA-7B with a cooled seeker. It was reported that Iraq Army had 20,000 shoulder-fired SA-7s, SA 14s, and SA-16s, as well as a few French Mistral.
Allied Strategy
In an effort to defeat the Iraqis, the coalition had identified five strategic objectives. They are as follows:
a. To prepare for a later ground campaign by exacting the maximum damage to Iraqi troops in and around Kuwait.
b. To eliminate Iraqi long range offensive capability against Saudi Arabia and Israel.
c. To eliminate the current and future Iraqi threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare.
d. To destroy Saddam Hussein’s ability to control his forces or at the least his ability to do so in a secure manner.
e. To destabilize Saddam Hussein’s regime by a combination of direct threats to the Iraqi leadership group and demonstrations of capability against important Iraqi resources.
Having the best of its intelligence used it to the fullest, the Allied planners envisaged a three pronged strategy for winning the electronic battle, concentrating on the simultaneous implementation of the following objectives.
a. Surpression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) by jamming, anti-radiation missiIe, decoys and precision guided weapons delivered by penetrating aircraft and standoff platforms.
b. Crippling the C3 network by jamming with EC-130 Compass Call aircraft, until the main
command and control system could be destroyed by strike aircraft.
c.The use of onboard Defensive ECM by penetrating aircraft to defeat any SAMs which would get airborne in spite of the preceding activity.
The first phase of SEAD campaign is to paralyze at the earliest possible GCI/EW network by attacking key radar and C3 sites. This is to be achieved by a series of simultaneous attacks by a range of different aircraft types. Once the network was paralyzed, individual area defenses and point defenses would have to light up their local radar to acquire inbound Allied aircraft and thus exposing themselves. SEAD aircraft attached to inbound strike packages would then attack the local area defenses, with the twofold objectives of preventing attrition of strike aircraft and inflicting attrition upon elements of the IADs, thus implementing the second phase of the SEAD campaign.
The principal targets of this second phase of the SEAD campaign were the static and particularly mobile area defense SAMs, which had the capability to engage aircraft at high and medium altitudes, outside the coverage of point defense SAMs and AAA.
Planning and Preparation
Before the crisis erupted, US naval intelligence was in the process of analyzing major Third World integrated air-defense systems, many of which might have to be penetrated by naval strike aircraft. As it happened, the analysis of the Iraqi system was completed just before the crisis began in August 1990. Fortunately, too, the coalition had more than five months (before the invasion of Kuwait and the opening of hostilities). The
Various subtypes of the EC/RC 135 Rivet Joint, the high fying TR-1(U-2), the USN EP-3, EKA-3B and the RAF’s Nimrod R.1 aircraft were the keys system that were strategically positioned to cover particular sectors of lADS coverage when Allied aircraft,
By the mid-Jan, the Coalition force had a comprehensive picture of Iraq’s lADS and was ready to inflict knockout blow against the system, with substantial hard kill defense suppression assets in the theatre. Key systems were the Wild Weasel4, a Phantom airframe fitted with a potent radar homing and warning receiver system (APR 47 RHAWS), which was supplemented by the HARM2 firing F16C and F/A-18C. These aircraft were further supported by Alarm firing Tornado GR.ls of the RAF and HARM5 capable EA-6B Prowlers, A-7Es and A-6Es of the USN. Jamming assets assembled in the theatre included USAF EC-130 Compass Call standoff communications jammers, Naval EA43B Prowlers and the USAF's EF-111A Ravens.
Employment of EW assets
E-3B AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) B-707 Sentry aircraft were used to detect incoming enemy aircraft and to guide fighters to intercept as necessary. E-8 J-STARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) representing the land warfare version of AWACS. Carried on a Boeing 707, the system incorporated the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS).
The EA-6A Prowlers and EF-111A Ravens were used for ECM. EC-130H Compass Call aircraft and F-4G Wild Weasels were used to jam enemy radars. The F-4G were also used for SEAD as were the A-6E Intruders. A-7E Corsairs and F/A-18 Hornets. The High Speed Anti Radiation Missile (HARM) was used by US aircraft for SEAD. The RAF employed the Air Launched Anti-Radiation Missile (ALARM) for similar attacks by Tornado GR.1s.
RF-4C and RC-135s provided reconnaissance. The RC-135 is a modified Boeing 707, which provides electronic reconnaissance. The RAF’s Tornado GR.1As were also used for tactical reconnaissance, especially during the “Scud hunt”. The U-2R and TR-1A could provide a capability for electronic, radar, photographic and infra red coverage across 5,000 km of territory, 180 km wide.
COALISION FORCES ATTACK
The phased air strike was code named Instant Thunder. Phase 1 (seven to ten days) was the simultaneous attack on the Iraqi national air-defense system and on the strategic targets it protected. Phase 2 was a day long attack on Iraqi air defenses in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) as a prelude to battlefield attacks. Phase 3 was a lengthy series of attacks on those ground forces preparatory to a ground beginning
The first air strike came form 50 Tomahawk cruise missiles, which were targeted against key military command and control posts, and government building. The first aircraft to enter hostile airspace were USAF EF-111A Ravens at about at about O3:00 hrs local time on the 17th January. The aircraft together with USN/USMC EA-6B crews hit the radiate switches on their ALQ-99 consoles, unleashing a torrent of noises and deception jamming signals into Iraqis airwaves. Supported by the EC-130s jamming of all known communications frequencies, the solid wall of electromagnetic garbage hid multiple waves of inbound strike aircraft and cruise missiles, while paralyzing much of Iraq's communications. This enables the main strike forces to arrive virtually undetected and attack the Iraqi IADS. F-4Gs, F/A-18s and EA-6B fired HARM missiles and Tornado IDS fired ALARM missiles at Iraqi air defense and SAM radars.
Allied SEAD and jamming campaign was great success, with Iraqi radar communications and SAM activity collapsing within a day. While SEAD and jamming aircraft continued to escort Allied strike packages throughout the campaign, the number of missile launches and radar activity dwindled with ongoing time as attrition took its toll, and Iraqi SAM and radar operators refused to light up their radars for fear of being hit.
In the opening phase of the SEAD campaign was an attack by a Army AH-64 Apache helicopters with Hellfire laser guided missiles against a pair of critical early warning radar sites in Southern Iraq. Eight aircraft of the 101st Airborne were led almost
The USN expanded this aspect of the SEAD campaign by launching large numbers of TALD (Brunswick Tactical Air Launched Decoy) unpowered decoys to seduce the Iraqis into firing off their limited SAM stocks. So successful were the TALDs that the Iraqis stubbornly maintained, well into the campaign, that they had shot down several hundred Allied aircraft. Again the decoys created an opening for the HARM shots. Another benefit of the use of such decoys, particularly with the static SAM systems, is that it forces the expenditure of ready rounds on launchers, leaving a time window of several minutes or more during the reloading of the launchers, when the battery is defenseless against air attack and has already blown its position.
During the first waves, the attack force consisted of 530 USAF, 90 USN and USMC, 24 RAF, 12 French and 12 Saudi Arabian aircraft fired AGM 88 HARM anti-
Cruise missiles and F-117A Stealth Fighters struck at key C3 sites. To further disable the Iraqi C3 network, which due jamming would have to revert to land Line communications, many of the cruise missiles were targeted at electrical power stations and distribution yards. The effect was to cripple those 'communications and command facilities, which did not have standby (backup) power systems, and those repeaters links which operated on main grid power.
The use of ECM as an offensive measure involves either deception measures or jamming with jamming pods proving most effective against Iraqis SA-6 and SA-8 SAM systems. ECM attempts to defeat enemy detection, identification and acquisition, and missile launch, quidance and fusing systems. Deception measures involve:
a. Simulating operational system noises, such as air-to-ground communication in order to deceive enemy interceptors.
b. Mounting electronic attack as feints aimed at making an enemy commit his defenses at a time and place of your choice.
c. Intruding into an enemy’s communications system to plant false information.
d. Launching aerodynamic or infra-red decoys.
This was demonstrated by USAF's 4468th Tactical Reconnaissance Group launched groups of Northrop BQM-74 Scathe Mean drones towards Basra and Baghdad. Flying from Saudi territory, the drones took up station in the vicinity of the targets and flew in loose formations, pretending to be inbound bombers. Iraqi SAM operator attempted to engage, and instantly attracted HARMs from waiting Weasels and Hornets. Concurrently with the opening moves in the SEAD campaign, Allied interdictors hit key Iraqi air bases, cutting runways and taxiways to prevent all air movements where possible.
The centralized structure of the IADS collapsed inside the first hour of the assault and Iraq's fate was sealed thereafter. This did not however prevent the Iraqis from using their point defense weapons and some of the area defense weapons, with which they continued to threaten the Allied aircraft with SAM launches and AAA fire.
LESSONS LEARNT
When Gulf War ended, it was obvious that the war was so one-sided because the
We have to accept the reality that in modern war the electronic battle must precede the opening of the counter-air battle. The attainment of air superiority requires the attainment of electromagnetic superiority as who controls the airwaves will control the skies. Lessons that can be learnt from this war are as follows.
Emission Control
The Iraqis has grossly violated a basic principle of electronic combat by lighting up radars outside actual engagements, and then not moving or reshuffling their assets to
SEAD
In conducting counter air battle to achieve command of the air, followed by interdiction campaigns to inflict attrition, must be expanded by the introduction of an electronic campaign to cripple the opponent's C3 and IADS. It must be noted that the main objective of the electronic campaign will always be the destruction of the opponent's air defense capability.
Jamming
The deluge of jamming and anti-radiation missiles represented nothing less than a war of attrition against electronic assets. In this respect the electronic battle has
An aircraft can jam and dodge a missile, whereas a land based radar or SAM system can neither jam nor dodge an anti-radiation missile. It can only shut itself down and by doing so withdraw from the engagement, this unilateral move may not prevent a SEAD tasked aircraft from locating and destroying the shut down radar. Decoy emitters only delay the inevitable.
Air Defense
Unless the attacking air force is particularly ill matched to the task, the advantage must lay with the attacker. Historical evidence easily supports this assertion, the only times when SAM based defenses were successful was during the transient phase of deploying a new technology (GA-6 in Yom Kippur), once the limitations of the new weapon were understood the war of attrition swung in the favor of air power. This would have also been true of the SA-10, SA-11 and GA-12 in any European conflict.
Similarly the utility of SAM and AAA systems is doubtful. They cannot prevent air power from inflicting attrition and themselves inflict only questionable levels of attrition on an attacking force. Where low level SAMs are the only types available, using PGMs from medium altitude defeats the SAM and AAA defense totally.
ECM
A useful compromise is a capability based on role specific high power communications and radar jamming pods, carried by standard or modified tactical aircraft, these pods being targeted at generic and known threat systems.
A mix of noise jamming, false target generator and communication jamming pods carried by either of the tactical jet types could prove of substantial usefulness particularly during the crucial opening phase of any conflict. The design of such pods or modification of existing overseas designs could be a useful way of developing an indigenous EW manufacturing and support infrastructure.
Air Campaign
From a theoretical perspective, the Allied raids fall as much into the counter-air campaign as into the SEAD campaign, an interesting parallel to the above noted hits on C3 facilities This illustrates the need for a concerted effort in any air war, the strategic
CONCLUSION
Electronic combat has become a prerequisite for a successful air battle in modern air warfare. It is an established engineering and operational discipline where success is achieved through systematic effort. The Gulf War demonstrated beyond any doubt the importance of electronic combat, to the modern air war and those who fail to take note today will be tomorrow's losers. Failure to understand the dynamics and strategy of electronic combat could turn the tide to the adversary. The MAF have been lacking in this field and until now, we have yet to see any serious commitment to develop its capability in this area. Hopefully this will eventually take place, if it doesn1t we may become the loser in any future conflict.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books:
Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The war for Kuwait, Airlife Publishing Ltd, England, 1992.
The Gulf War lessons and their implications for the future, London, 1992.
Gulf Lesson One – The value of Air Power, Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn, Canberra 1992.
Royal Australian Air Force, Air Power Manual, Victoria, 1990
Electronic Combat Principles, Haigate 1989.
1 Norman Friedman, Desert victory: the war for Kuwait, Airlife Publishing Ltd, England, 1992 pg 153.
2 Tall King is a low frequency (150-180 MHz) radar enjoying long range (reportly 500-600 km but unlikely to detect low fliers, particularly small ones such as Tomahawk missiles. Mazimum altitude coverage is 150,000 ft.
3 Squat Eye is a mast mounted, C-band radar with a rated range of 210 km. Used by Iraqi Army to support SA-3 missiles
4 Standard air force Wild Weasal doctrine is for the F-4G hunter equipped with radar detectors (APR-38 or –47) and HARM missiles to be accompanied by killers whose HARM and cluster bombs destroy the radar site neutralized by the HARMs. The two seat F-4G is used as a hunter because the rear seat operator (the RIO) can concentrate on finding enemy radars.
5 The High Speed Anti Radar Missile (HARM, AGM-88) was the main means of defeating Iraqi radars, particularly those used for antiaircraft fire control. Like other anti radar missiles, HARM detects enemy radar signals and homes on the emitter.
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