..freedom vs peace..

'Western' models not working

2011/08/18

THERE is no doubt that the sparks that set off the riots in London and the Arab Spring are distinct. The London riots were ignited by police killing a black man while the immediate trigger for the outbreak of protests in the Middle-East was the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia.

While the revolts in the Middle East were directed at their ageing leaders and ineffectual governments, the riots in London were seen as class warfare. Some commentators, therefore, were quick to point out that England is not the Middle East.

But what took place in the streets of London, Birmingham, and Liverpool is a sign of the corrosion taking place in Western democracies. When the new Arab revolt erupted, Western powers were singing praises of the disaffected youth. The young activists were seen as a beacon of hope struggling against "sultanistic" dictatorships.

What they fail to tell the Arab youths is a simple truth: regime change will not necessarily bring about political stability and prosperity.

While Western governments, the United States in particular, are pushing for market liberalisation, the financial crisis that is gripping the European Union and the US is symptomatic of a market failure that was set in motion by former US president Ronald Reagan's and former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher's market orthodoxies.

As such, some of the violence in London can be traced to the austerity programmes that the United Kingdom instituted. Cash-strapped Western governments are also cutting social services, everything from libraries and daycare centres to transit and snow removal.

The US has bucked the kind of violence that erupted in London but it is only a matter of time before Americans realise that unemployment is not a temporary phenomenon but a more permanent one.

The Arabs and their youth should be wary of embracing the Western liberal democratic model as a market economy and democracy are not a sure fit.

Economically, the oil shocks of 1973 to 1974 and 1979 to 1980 brought down the curtain on that fortunate, early postwar combination of high growth, low inflation and low unemployment in North America and Europe.

Although economists differ on the origins of the slowdown, virtually all econometric analyses confirm the view of the man on the street: Western economies took a turn for the worse around 1973 to 1974, and are still reeling from the financial meltdown in 2008.

Recovery is, therefore, a slow and uncertain process. In recent years, Europe had high unemployment; the US endured sharply reduced rates of real wage growth and, now, unemployment.

What more, as the massacre in Norway illustrates, Europe is shying away from multiculturalism and is becoming less tolerant.

Increased mobility and growing individuation eroded family and community ties in the West and, as the London riots demonstrate, the trend towards declining respect for authority continued in Western society.

Facing an altered electoral marketplace, leaders everywhere call for less government, less bureaucracy, less regulation and less public spending.

Should the rest of the developing world, the Middle East included, continue to trot down the same developmental path as the West, the twin problem of market and government failure will continue to haunt humanity.

DR AZEEM FAZWAN AHMAD FAROUKSenior lecturer and chairman of Political Science SectionSchool of Social SciencesUniversiti Sains Malaysia Penang

... england riot ...

a note to us

Double standard of Democracy..

This articel was wrote by Dr Mahathir, which discuss on democracy and non interfering policy base on current world situations.. the manipulations of super power on United Nations Organizations were something for us to think about..

1. There is much gloating in the West overwhat is happening in the Arab countries. They, the West, have been peddlingdemocracy to the world and at times they would assassinate leaders or invadecountries so as to impose their democracy. Now the Arabs are doing this work for them. The Arabs themselves are overthrowing their authoritarian Governmentsso as to, presumably, install democratic Governments in their places.

2. Overthrowing Governments is serious business. It normally involves violence and killings. Fortunately the people inTunisia and Egypt have achieved their objectives without too much bloodshed. But the Libyan Government is not ready to go. So are the Governments of Syria,
Yemen and Bahrain.

3. The situation in these four countries is not to the liking of the western democrats. They want to make sure that the despotic rulers surrender and the forces of democracy take over. If the people
cannot overthrow their Governments by themselves, than the West must take a
hand in ensuring that the authoritarian rulers are deposed.

4. I don’t think it is right for theWestern powers to interfere. We believe strongly in non-interference in theinternal affairs of independent nations. That was what independence was about:the right to manage a nation’s affairs by its people. And the uprisings ofpeople, be they simple demonstration, civil wars or rebellions are basicallythe internal affairs of the countries’ concerned. No one really has a right to interfere.

5. But then one remembers Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Cambodia the Pol Pot regime decided to get rid of all intellectuals and others believed to be against the Government. The world knew something horrid was happening in that country but a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of nations stood in the way. As a result two million Cambodians were systematically bludgeoned to death.

6. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the Serbs openly announced that they intended to cleanse the country of European Muslims. With guns and bombs and missiles they set about doing this as the world watched live on TV. Even when NATO soldiers were sent in, they turned a blind eye when the Serbs systematically massacred 12,000 Bosnian men and boys while the women were raped. The Dutch soldiers tasked with protecting these people simply moved away.

7. Far from helping the Bosnians the West decreed that no weapons should be supplied to them. This is to “reduce” killings. Let the killings be done by the Serbs only. Allowing the Bosnians to
defend themselves, would result in Serbs being killed also. And so the Bosnians were massacred by the Serbs, without Serb deaths adding to the numbers killed.

8. By the time the United Nations decided to send in a peace-keeping force, a hundred thousand Bosnians had been killed.

9. The price for non-interference is clearly very high. But is it better for other countries to send forces to help the rebels or the Government. The Americans went into Korea, Vietnam and
Grenada to support the Governments of these countries. The result is a full-scale war in which a lot of people, not just soldiers were killed. The end of the wars saw Korea divided into two and the defeat of the United States in Vietnam. Only in Grenada was the mighty US successful.

10. Apparently interventions in the internal affairs of nations do not always yield good result. It is worse when force has to be used.

11. Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in increasing the numbers killed without the objectives being realised. Indeed the situation now is perhaps worse than before intervention.

12. Today we see NATO forces not just supporting the rebels in Libya but have actually carried out military assaults against Government forces. They have interpreted “no-fly zone” to mean outright aerial attacks against Gadaffi. In fact it is obvious that NATO is bent on assassinating the Libyan leader and his family. Is this the right way to reduce bloodshed?

13. Bloodshed is not something to be encouraged. But when attacks are made against the Government there is bound to be bloodshed.

14. We have all but forgotten that one of the most important reasons for setting up the United Nations is to end wars. What is happening in Libya and other Arab countries is war, civil war. It is
the bounden duty of the United Nations to stop the wars. But the United Nations should not pass judgement and take sides. The United Nations should not help one side to defeat the other.

15. But then how should the United Nations go about stopping the killings? Is it by a “no-fly zone” resolution? We are seeing now that “no-fly zone” means aerial and ground attacks by NATO forces against Libyan Government forces. Basically the United Nations have declared war against Libya. It is hardly in keeping with an institution to end wars and promote peace.

16. What the United Nations should do is to engineer a peaceful solution. It should try to get the two sides to agree to negotiate, or to submit to United Nations arbitration, or to seek for judgement of the claims by a world court. If all these fail a referendum supervised by the UN should be held so as to ascertain the true wishes of the people.

17. If any side refuses to all these means of peaceful settlement, then the United Nations must act against the recalcitrant side. Force may need to be used to get the recalcitrant to accept United Nations’ efforts at peaceful settlement of the dispute.

18. It is important that the United Nations does not allow NATO or any other power to act on its behalf. The operation should be a United Nations operation commanded by United Nations – appointed commanders.

19. This action is not new because the United Nations has always been tasked to keep combatants apart. However the United Nations may have to use more force than usual in order to separate the
warring factions and bring them to the negotiating table.

20. It is likely that if the operation is truly a United Nations operation for the purpose of giving both sides a hearing or for conducting a national referendum, the parties to the conflicts are more
likely to show respect for the move.

...ASEAN..

Asean

INTRODUCTION

Granting that the Southeast Asian region has conflicts and disputes that require multilateral or regional intervention, does ASEAN have the will and capacity to take up this role? Broadly defined, ASEAN itself is a confidence-building mechanism. In a sense, it prevents conflicts by managing interdependence and promoting integration giving its members stakes in each other’s peace, stability and prosperity. Its enduring commitment to respect each other’s territorial integrity has eliminated grave threats of invasion or incursion within the neighborhood.

Over the years, ASEAN has slowly but consistently undertaken some initiatives to promote the habit of dialogue and consultation as ways of preventing conflicts. These include providing a multilateral forum for political and security dialogue in the form of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Within ASEAN, processes like the annual ASEAN summit, regular meetings of ASEAN foreign ministers, and joint meetings of foreign and defense officials keep the communications open among the member states.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Prior to the creation of ASEAN in 1967, there were a number of regional organizations in the sub-region. These included the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo. Of these only Maphilindo and ASA were initiated and supported exclusively by Southeast Asian nations.

The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was formed in 1961 comprising Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. The initial proposal for the formation of a regional grouping among the countries in Southeast Asia came in 1958 from Tuanku Abdul Rahman. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the five original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999.

Despite the dominance of political and strategic consideration in its founding, the Bangkok Declaration which heralded the formation of ASEAN placed its major emphasis on regional economic cooperation and social stability as evidenced in the seven point declaration which outlined the aims and purposes of the association. These goals and purposes were:

a. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours.

b. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region.

c. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the fields of economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields.

d. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities.

e. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, the improvement of their transport and communication facilities and the raising of the living standards of their people.

f. To promote Southeast Asian Studies.

g. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes and explore all avenues for such closer cooperation among themselves.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia, signed at the First ASEAN Summit on 24 February 1976, declared that in their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties should be guided by the following fundamental principles:

a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations;

b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;

c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;

d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner;

e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and

f. Effective cooperation among themselves.

The TAC stated that ASEAN political and security dialogue and cooperation should aim to promote regional peace and stability by enhancing regional resilience. Regional resilience shall be achieved by cooperating in all fields based on the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation, and solidarity, which shall constitute the foundation for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia.

Western nations have long criticized ASEAN's non-interference policy when serious issues should be addressed. But ASEAN members say its policy of non-confrontation is more effective and in tune with Asian cultural ways. Although individual member states have been critical, the grouping has been reluctant to tackle the issue as a bloc.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASEAN

From the very beginning, the ASEAN Founding Fathers made clear that "the Association is open for participation to all States in Southeast Asian region subscribing to the [ASEAN] aims, principles and purposes”.

Having included all the 10 Southeast Asian nations in its membership, therefore, represents a historic achievement of ASEAN as a confidence-building mechanism in the region. The fact that its members have different political systems - including some with opposite ideologies - makes the achievement even more remarkable. ASEAN appears to be the only regional organization with such unique political diversity.

From the original five, the membership expanded to six in 1984 with the admission of Brunei Darussalam, after the country gained independence from the British. The most significant expansion came in 1995 with the admission of Vietnam into the ASEAN fold. This was truly a historic development in Southeast Asia, a paradigm shift in the regional strategic outlook. For just a few years earlier ASEAN and Vietnam were still locked in a bitter conflict over Kampuchea. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Philippines and Thailand were active U.S. allies in the war in Indochina. And the communist ideology was and still is banned in all the first six ASEAN members. After Vietnam, the arrival of Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in this year has added some more political diversities to ASEAN.

Neither Treaty nor any other ASEAN agreements require ASEAN members to change their political systems into any specific homogenized system. ASEAN has never assigned itself the mission of transforming its members into any uniform political system. ASEAN did not set any political criterion for its prospective members to fulfil before admission, unlike in the EU where a prospective member must first meet all the criteria of democratic pluralism.

Each ASEAN nation will continue to preserve its national government and identity in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of its people. But they all are legally bound by the code of conduct under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, among other agreements as well as practices in ASEAN.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

As the ASEAN membership grew in number, outsiders began to question whether the “ASEAN way” could continue to work. Worse still, whether the old and new members “speak the same political language” and appreciate each other's national imperatives.

Over the years since its establishment, ASEAN has seen several changes in the political system of some of its members; the Philippines, for example, was not so free during the Marcos dictatorship; neither was Thailand democratic during the military rule of Gen Suchinda Kraprayoon and his clique in 1991-92; the upheaval in Indonesia is the latest case in point. If history is any guide, we can safety assume that more changes are forthcoming in the next three decades. But these changes will more likely be generated by the internal dynamics rather than by any external pressures.

ASEAN has never been used as a platform to provoke conflicts among its members. But by shelving potentially contentious issues, ASEAN, in fact, is on the receiving end of criticism in the way its prevents disputes from becoming more serious than maintaining the status quo. Minimalists philosophy contends that the whole range of ASEAN political, economic and functional cooperation is a form of confidence building aimed at promoting friendship and avoiding misunderstanding.

For example the management of the Sipadan and Ligitan disputes suggests the centrality of the principle of consent by the parties concerned in paving the way for third party adjudication. In the same manner, it is also the consent of Indonesia that made possible the deployment of the multinational peacekeeping force in East Timor to stabilize the fast deteriorating situation there following the referendum of August 1999

The haze crisis in 1997/98, has proven ASEAN to be a reliable confidence-building process as well as a flexible regional entity for purposeful cooperation. Without ASEAN, those countries badly affected by the haze smoke must have been up in arms against Indonesia already. It would be impossible for these neighbours to accept, let alone understand, why the recurring illegal forest burning in Kalimantan and Sumatra could not be stopped.

The “ASEAN way” in addressing the haze crisis was to help Indonesia cope, rather than to blame it for this massive and highly complex problem. A great deal of resources has been marshalled to implement ASEAN's regional haze action plan, with generous support from the Asian Development Bank - ADB and a few other dialogue partners of ASEAN. A new haze task force coordination unit has also been established at the ASEAN Secretariat.

The financial crisis, which erupted in Thailand in July 1997 and escalated into an economic crisis engulfing the entire ASEAN region in 1998 created a new and immediate challenge to the “ASEAN way”, especially with respect to the non-interference principle. The severity and speed of the contagion clearly showed a high degree of interdependence among the ASEAN economies. Rightly or wrongly, the ASEAN economies are now seen as a single economic region, a contiguous market in the eye of most international investors and bankers.

Should all else fail, ASEAN has put in place a dispute settlement mechanism under the Protocol on Dispute Settlement signed in 1995. One key element here is the use of majority decision - rather than consensus - to settle a dispute.

In both the haze and the economic crises, the "ASEAN way" of equality, quiet persuasion, consultation and consensus and shared responsibility have been proven to be most practical and agreeable to all in ASEAN. At times it may not be the most effective way of decision-making and getting urgent things done efficiently. But it certainly is not a “recipe of paralysis”.

ASEAN’s policy of non-interference, one situation that demands evaluation is the group’s actions toward what is arguably its most repressive member, Burma. The other members of ASEAN regularly state that they will not, and do not, interfere in the internal affairs of Burma, but is this really the case?

The people of Burma have a great desire for democracy and this was legitimately certified through the elections in 1990, when the various parties that comprised the pro-democracy movement won by a landside. However, the election results were not implemented. Instead, the dictatorship reacted with great violence and repression, extending even to acts of genocide against certain ethnic groups. In this case, then, the only ethical position for foreign parties, be they nations, multinational businesses, non-governmental and supranational organizations, and also members of the general public, is to act on behalf of the Burmese people, to relieve their suffering and to see that democracy is installed. Any such acts are in no way interference, since they align perfectly with the wishes of the people. On the other hand, anything that props up the dictatorship and allows it to perpetuate its repression clearly constitutes interference.

ANALYSIS

The “ASEAN way” is dynamic and evolving. It is full of flexibility and accommodation. From such mundane matters as setting a meeting date to advancing some regional policy initiatives, due deference is usually given to the views of a member country hosting a meeting or chairing a particular committee. A member country coordinating ASEAN's dialogue relations with a partner country, especially on matters relating to project proposals seeking funding support from the dialogue partner, tends to have more say in the direction and pace of the relations. This is nothing wrong since the country coordinatorship is rotated in alphabetical order once every three years. Every member, sooner or later, gets the opportunity to coordinate ASEAN's relations with key dialogue partners such as Japan, EU and China.

The “ASEAN way” will continue to adapt to the changing situation, but its key principles - specifically non-interference - will not change. In fact the “ASEAN way” has already won acceptance in the ARF. There is no valid reason to change something that has worked successfully for over three decades in ASEAN.

The second article of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) commits all parties to settle differences or disputes by peaceful means and to renounce the threat or use of force. Enacted under treaty obligations, this is one of the most important contributions of ASEAN to securing regional stability. But its application is limited to inter-state relations. ASEAN has no legally binding instrument setting a common standard in managing domestic conflicts.

The establishment of ASEAN following the period of decolonization, the Declaration of ZOPFAN at the height of the Cold War, the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation eight years after the establishment of ASEAN, the completion of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone eighteen years after Indonesia submitted a working paper on the denuclearization of Southeast Asia, the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum at the end of the Cold War, the provision for an ASEAN Troika after the East Timor experience, the ASEAN - China political declaration on the South China Sea on the eve of the sixth ASEAN - China Summit, and the participation of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary - General for Humanitarian Affairs in Southeast Asia at the annual ASEAN Post - Ministerial Conferences for almost the whole decade of the 1980s - all came about in response to specific threats, challenges, crises, and opportunities of their specific times. Some of them have enduring usefulness, some limited, while others might have been superseded by new realities, alliances and purposes. They have made up the building blocks of cooperative security community in Southeast Asia.

CONCLUSION

Differences in political systems do not constitute any hindrance to strengthening ASEAN unity and solidarity. On the contrary, ASEAN sees the diversity in its membership as a source of strength and inspiration for fostering a strong sense of community and regional solidarity. All ASEAN members willingly agree to share the primary responsibility to ensure peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

While ASEAN has found comfort and strength in its enlargement, ASEAN is not a military alliance and sees no need to become one in the foreseeable future. This is simply because ASEAN has no enemy. The fact that ASEAN is not a threat, real or perceived, to anyone outside ASEAN makes it the ideal driving force in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) process.

One needs to bear in mind the fact that ASEAN is an intergovernmental association established and sustained by voluntary participation of member governments and countries based on equality. They have come together to work in this regional grouping with the common belief that peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being in Southeast Asia.