INTRODUCTION
Granting that the Southeast Asian region has conflicts and disputes that require multilateral or regional intervention, does ASEAN have the will and capacity to take up this role? Broadly defined, ASEAN itself is a confidence-building mechanism. In a sense, it prevents conflicts by managing interdependence and promoting integration giving its members stakes in each other’s peace, stability and prosperity. Its enduring commitment to respect each other’s territorial integrity has eliminated grave threats of invasion or incursion within the neighborhood.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the creation of ASEAN in 1967, there were a number of regional organizations in the sub-region. These included the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo. Of these only Maphilindo and ASA were initiated and supported exclusively by Southeast Asian nations.
The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was formed in 1961 comprising Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. The initial proposal for the formation of a regional grouping among the countries in Southeast Asia came in 1958 from Tuanku Abdul Rahman. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the five original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999.
Despite the dominance of political and strategic consideration in its founding, the Bangkok Declaration which heralded the formation of ASEAN placed its major emphasis on regional economic cooperation and social stability as evidenced in the seven point declaration which outlined the aims and purposes of the association. These goals and purposes were:
a. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours.
b. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region.
c. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the fields of economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields.
d. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities.
e. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, the improvement of their transport and communication facilities and the raising of the living standards of their people.
f. To promote Southeast Asian Studies.
g. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes and explore all avenues for such closer cooperation among themselves.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia, signed at the First ASEAN Summit on 24 February 1976, declared that in their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties should be guided by the following fundamental principles:
a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations;
b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;
c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner;
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and
f. Effective cooperation among themselves.
The TAC stated that ASEAN political and security dialogue and cooperation should aim to promote regional peace and stability by enhancing regional resilience. Regional resilience shall be achieved by cooperating in all fields based on the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation, and solidarity, which shall constitute the foundation for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia.
Western nations have long criticized ASEAN's non-interference policy when serious issues should be addressed. But ASEAN members say its policy of non-confrontation is more effective and in tune with Asian cultural ways. Although individual member states have been critical, the grouping has been reluctant to tackle the issue as a bloc.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASEAN
From the very beginning, the ASEAN Founding Fathers made clear that "the Association is open for participation to all States in Southeast Asian region subscribing to the [ASEAN] aims, principles and purposes”.
Having included all the 10 Southeast Asian nations in its membership, therefore, represents a historic achievement of ASEAN as a confidence-building mechanism in the region. The fact that its members have different political systems - including some with opposite ideologies - makes the achievement even more remarkable. ASEAN appears to be the only regional organization with such unique political diversity.
From the original five, the membership expanded to six in 1984 with the admission of Brunei Darussalam, after the country gained independence from the British. The most significant expansion came in 1995 with the admission of Vietnam into the ASEAN fold. This was truly a historic development in Southeast Asia, a paradigm shift in the regional strategic outlook. For just a few years earlier ASEAN and Vietnam were still locked in a bitter conflict over Kampuchea. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Philippines and Thailand were active U.S. allies in the war in Indochina. And the communist ideology was and still is banned in all the first six ASEAN members. After Vietnam, the arrival of Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in this year has added some more political diversities to ASEAN.
Neither Treaty nor any other ASEAN agreements require ASEAN members to change their political systems into any specific homogenized system. ASEAN has never assigned itself the mission of transforming its members into any uniform political system. ASEAN did not set any political criterion for its prospective members to fulfil before admission, unlike in the EU where a prospective member must first meet all the criteria of democratic pluralism.
Each ASEAN nation will continue to preserve its national government and identity in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of its people. But they all are legally bound by the code of conduct under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, among other agreements as well as practices in ASEAN.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
As the ASEAN membership grew in number, outsiders began to question whether the “ASEAN way” could continue to work. Worse still, whether the old and new members “speak the same political language” and appreciate each other's national imperatives.
Over the years since its establishment, ASEAN has seen several changes in the political system of some of its members; the Philippines, for example, was not so free during the Marcos dictatorship; neither was Thailand democratic during the military rule of Gen Suchinda Kraprayoon and his clique in 1991-92; the upheaval in Indonesia is the latest case in point. If history is any guide, we can safety assume that more changes are forthcoming in the next three decades. But these changes will more likely be generated by the internal dynamics rather than by any external pressures.
ASEAN has never been used as a platform to provoke conflicts among its members. But by shelving potentially contentious issues, ASEAN, in fact, is on the receiving end of criticism in the way its prevents disputes from becoming more serious than maintaining the status quo. Minimalists philosophy contends that the whole range of ASEAN political, economic and functional cooperation is a form of confidence building aimed at promoting friendship and avoiding misunderstanding.
For example the management of the Sipadan and Ligitan disputes suggests the centrality of the principle of consent by the parties concerned in paving the way for third party adjudication. In the same manner, it is also the consent of Indonesia that made possible the deployment of the multinational peacekeeping force in East Timor to stabilize the fast deteriorating situation there following the referendum of August 1999
The haze crisis in 1997/98, has proven ASEAN to be a reliable confidence-building process as well as a flexible regional entity for purposeful cooperation. Without ASEAN, those countries badly affected by the haze smoke must have been up in arms against Indonesia already. It would be impossible for these neighbours to accept, let alone understand, why the recurring illegal forest burning in Kalimantan and Sumatra could not be stopped.
The “ASEAN way” in addressing the haze crisis was to help Indonesia cope, rather than to blame it for this massive and highly complex problem. A great deal of resources has been marshalled to implement ASEAN's regional haze action plan, with generous support from the Asian Development Bank - ADB and a few other dialogue partners of ASEAN. A new haze task force coordination unit has also been established at the ASEAN Secretariat.
The financial crisis, which erupted in Thailand in July 1997 and escalated into an economic crisis engulfing the entire ASEAN region in 1998 created a new and immediate challenge to the “ASEAN way”, especially with respect to the non-interference principle. The severity and speed of the contagion clearly showed a high degree of interdependence among the ASEAN economies. Rightly or wrongly, the ASEAN economies are now seen as a single economic region, a contiguous market in the eye of most international investors and bankers.
Should all else fail, ASEAN has put in place a dispute settlement mechanism under the Protocol on Dispute Settlement signed in 1995. One key element here is the use of majority decision - rather than consensus - to settle a dispute.
In both the haze and the economic crises, the "ASEAN way" of equality, quiet persuasion, consultation and consensus and shared responsibility have been proven to be most practical and agreeable to all in ASEAN. At times it may not be the most effective way of decision-making and getting urgent things done efficiently. But it certainly is not a “recipe of paralysis”.
ASEAN’s policy of non-interference, one situation that demands evaluation is the group’s actions toward what is arguably its most repressive member, Burma. The other members of ASEAN regularly state that they will not, and do not, interfere in the internal affairs of Burma, but is this really the case?
The people of Burma have a great desire for democracy and this was legitimately certified through the elections in 1990, when the various parties that comprised the pro-democracy movement won by a landside. However, the election results were not implemented. Instead, the dictatorship reacted with great violence and repression, extending even to acts of genocide against certain ethnic groups. In this case, then, the only ethical position for foreign parties, be they nations, multinational businesses, non-governmental and supranational organizations, and also members of the general public, is to act on behalf of the Burmese people, to relieve their suffering and to see that democracy is installed. Any such acts are in no way interference, since they align perfectly with the wishes of the people. On the other hand, anything that props up the dictatorship and allows it to perpetuate its repression clearly constitutes interference.
ANALYSIS
The “ASEAN way” is dynamic and evolving. It is full of flexibility and accommodation. From such mundane matters as setting a meeting date to advancing some regional policy initiatives, due deference is usually given to the views of a member country hosting a meeting or chairing a particular committee. A member country coordinating ASEAN's dialogue relations with a partner country, especially on matters relating to project proposals seeking funding support from the dialogue partner, tends to have more say in the direction and pace of the relations. This is nothing wrong since the country coordinatorship is rotated in alphabetical order once every three years. Every member, sooner or later, gets the opportunity to coordinate ASEAN's relations with key dialogue partners such as Japan, EU and China.
The “ASEAN way” will continue to adapt to the changing situation, but its key principles - specifically non-interference - will not change. In fact the “ASEAN way” has already won acceptance in the ARF. There is no valid reason to change something that has worked successfully for over three decades in ASEAN.
The second article of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) commits all parties to settle differences or disputes by peaceful means and to renounce the threat or use of force. Enacted under treaty obligations, this is one of the most important contributions of ASEAN to securing regional stability. But its application is limited to inter-state relations. ASEAN has no legally binding instrument setting a common standard in managing domestic conflicts.
The establishment of ASEAN following the period of decolonization, the Declaration of ZOPFAN at the height of the Cold War, the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation eight years after the establishment of ASEAN, the completion of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone eighteen years after Indonesia submitted a working paper on the denuclearization of Southeast Asia, the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum at the end of the Cold War, the provision for an ASEAN Troika after the East Timor experience, the ASEAN - China political declaration on the South China Sea on the eve of the sixth ASEAN - China Summit, and the participation of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary - General for Humanitarian Affairs in Southeast Asia at the annual ASEAN Post - Ministerial Conferences for almost the whole decade of the 1980s - all came about in response to specific threats, challenges, crises, and opportunities of their specific times. Some of them have enduring usefulness, some limited, while others might have been superseded by new realities, alliances and purposes. They have made up the building blocks of cooperative security community in Southeast Asia.
CONCLUSION
Differences in political systems do not constitute any hindrance to strengthening ASEAN unity and solidarity. On the contrary, ASEAN sees the diversity in its membership as a source of strength and inspiration for fostering a strong sense of community and regional solidarity. All ASEAN members willingly agree to share the primary responsibility to ensure peace and stability in Southeast Asia.
While ASEAN has found comfort and strength in its enlargement, ASEAN is not a military alliance and sees no need to become one in the foreseeable future. This is simply because ASEAN has no enemy. The fact that ASEAN is not a threat, real or perceived, to anyone outside ASEAN makes it the ideal driving force in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) process.
One needs to bear in mind the fact that ASEAN is an intergovernmental association established and sustained by voluntary participation of member governments and countries based on equality. They have come together to work in this regional grouping with the common belief that peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being in Southeast Asia.
